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stability and every policymaker with an interest
in housing and housing finance.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis—especially
Robert H. Rasche, senior vice president and
director of Research, and William R. Emmons,
economist—for their assistance and comments,
but I retain full responsibility for errors.
SOME FACTS ABOUT HOUSING
Housing, particularly owner-occupied hous-
ing, has long been a public policy issue in the
United States. Over the years, these discussions
developed in two different directions: one focus-
ing on the availability of housing for lower-income
families, which I will not address here, and the
other on the development of housing in general
and the efficiency of mortgage markets.
The discussion of policies toward housing
and mortgage markets dates back to at least 1918.1
During the Great Depression, the National Housing
Act of 1934 created the Federal Housing Adminis-
tration (FHA) with the mandate to insure private
residential mortgages. In the aftermath of World
War II, the Serviceman’s Readjustment Act of 1944
created the Veterans Administration (VA) home-
loan guarantee program.2 Mortgages insured (or
I
am very pleased to be here today to par-
ticipate in this symposium sponsored by
the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight. The topics are important, and
the list of speakers impressive.
My purpose is to provide an overview of
longer-run trends in housing and housing finance.
The United States is well housed, and the housing
finance system has been working efficiently in
recent years. In the first two sections of my
remarks, I’ll discuss some of the history and
report some measures showing how the housing
stock has changed over time and how the housing
finance system has developed. Our aim must be
to sustain and extend this progress.
The third section of my remarks reflects my
long-standing interest in issues of financial sta-
bility stemming from my study of monetary eco-
nomics and financial history. Given the enormous
importance of housing and housing finance to the
U.S. economy, I think we do need to carefully
examine the potential for financial instability and
consider steps that could reduce the risk. In this
context, I especially want to commend OFHEO
for its recent report entitled, “Systemic Risk:
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Role of OFHEO.”
This report displays an impressive depth of schol-
arship in reviewing a large body of professional
literature on the subject. It deserves careful study
by every economist interested in issues of financial
1 Harry S. Schwartz, “The Role of Government-Sponsored Intermediaries,” Housing and Monetary Policy, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston,
Conference Series 4, 1970, p. 68.
2 George F. Break, “Federal Loan Insurance for Housing,” Housing and Monetary Policy, Federal Credit Agencies, Commission on Money and
Credit. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1963, p. 2.guaranteed) by the government gained consider-
able market share throughout the 1940s and 1950s,
reaching a peak share of 44.3 percent of 1-4 family
home mortgages in 1956. Since then, the share of
government-insured mortgages has declined
steadily; by the end of 2000 the share amounted
to only 13.8 percent.3
The original Federal National Mortgage
Association—Fannie Mae, as it came to be unoffi-
cially and affectionately called—was organized in
February 1938 to increase the volume of residen-
tial construction and develop a secondary market
in government-insured or -guaranteed mortgages.4
To achieve the first objective, from its inception
Fannie Mae purchased mortgages and issued its
own debt. Initially, Fannie Mae was funded
through the sale of preferred stock to the Treasury.
According to Jack M. Guttentag, writing in 1963,
government support was regarded as transitory
since it was “hoped that eventually the Treasury’s
investment can be retired with the proceeds of
common stock along with retained earnings, and
the function transferred to private ownership.”5
This objective was partially achieved in 1968
when the original Federal National Mortgage
Corporation was split into two parts: Government
National Mortgage Association, or Ginnie Mae,
which remained a government agency, and a
successor Fannie Mae (officially, still the Federal
National Mortgage Association) that was spun off
as a private corporation under a federal govern-
ment charter. In 1970 Ginnie Mae started guaran-
teeing mortgage-backed pass-through securities
representing shares in pools of FHA/VA guaran-
teed loans.6 At the same time, the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation—Freddie Mac—was
created to promote the development of a second-
ary market in conventional mortgages.
Another important development in the 1930s
was the creation in 1932 of the Federal Home
Loan Bank System (FHLB), which was chartered
to provide liquidity to thrift institutions. In 1934
the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corpora-
tion (FSLIC) was established to provide insurance
on shares of depositors in thrift institutions.7
With these institutions in place, though not
necessarily because of their creation, the net stock
of real residential assets per capita began to grow
after World War II. (See Figure 1.) The stock had
been trendless between $12,500 and $13,000
1996 dollars from the mid-1920s until after World
War II.8 From 1948 to 1970 the net real per capita
stock of residential structures grew at a 1.9 per-
cent annual rate. From 1971 to 2001 the net stock
grew at a somewhat lower average annual rate of
1.5 percent. By the end of 2001, the net per capita
stock of real residential structures had grown to
$32,700 1996 dollars.
As the stock of residential structures was grow-
ing, the quality of the housing stock was improv-
ing. According to the 1950 Census, 35.5 percent
of houses lacked complete plumbing facilities.
By 2000 the fraction of houses without complete
plumbing had fallen to 0.6 percent. In the 1960
Census—the first census that included a question
on telephones—21.5 percent of houses had no
telephone. By 2000 only 2.4 percent of houses
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3 Source: 1939-59: Economic Report of the President, February 1970, Table C-58; 1960-2000: Economic Report of the President, February
2002, Table B-75.
4 Jack M. Guttentag, “The Federal National Mortgage Association,” Housing and Monetary Policy, Federal Credit Agencies, Commission on
Money and Credit, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1963, p. 69.
5 Jack M. Guttentag, “The Federal National Mortgage Association,” Housing and Monetary Policy, Federal Credit Agencies, Commission on
Money and Credit. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1963, p. 73.
6 P.H. Hendershott, “The Market for Home Mortgage Credit”, in R.A. Gilbert, ed., The Changing Market in Financial Services, proceedings of the
15th Annual Economic Policy Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Norwell MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, p. 100.
7 Ernest Bloch, “The Federal Home Loan Bank System,” Housing and Monetary Policy, Federal Credit Agencies, Commission on Money and
Credit. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1963, p. 168-72.
8 Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce, Chain-Type Quantity Indexes for Net Stock of Fixed Assets and Consumer
Durable Goods. End-of-year quantity indexes are available from 1925-2001. The quantity indexes of net stocks of real residential and non-
residential assets are converted into net stocks valued in 1996 dollars.lacked a telephone. In the 1970 Census 4.4 percent
of houses were recorded as lacking complete
kitchen facilities. By 2000, only 1.3 percent of
houses were recorded as without complete kitchen
facilities. During this period the median size of
houses also increased—from 4.6 rooms in 1950
to 5.3 rooms in 2000.9
As the quantity and quality of the residential
housing stock increased, homeownership also
became more widespread. In the 1950 Census
the homeownership rate was reported at 55 per-
cent—by the 2000 Census it had increased to
67.5 percent.
SOME FACTS ABOUT HOUSING
FINANCE
Growth of the housing stock could not have
occurred without a robust system of mortgage
finance. There are several distinct sources of
mortgage finance in the United States.10 The
importance of these sources has varied consider-
ably over the years since World War II. The share
of 1-4 family mortgage loans held by commercial
banks increased in the immediate aftermath of
World War II to a peak of 19.4 percent in 1948; it
then trended down to 13.4 percent in 1961 at
which point the trend reversed and the share
trended up again, reaching almost 24 percent in
2000. (See Figure 2.) Life insurance companies
were a significant player in the residential mort-
gage market immediately after World War II, but
their share of lending peaked in 1951 at 23.5 per-
cent and has trended down ever since. By 2000,
the share of life insurance companies was only
3.4 percent, so these institutions have ceased to
be a significant factor in the residential mortgage
market. The share of “all other,” which includes
lending by individuals and private mortgage pools
decreased from 34.1 percent at the end of World
War II to 12.3 percent in 1977, after which it
started trending up and reached 21.4 percent by
2000.
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9 Rooms exclude bathrooms.
10 Source: 1939-59: Economic Report of the President, February 1970, Table C-59; 1960 to 2000: Economic Report of the President, February
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1-4 Family Mortgage LendingThe two remaining types of institutions that
at different times have been the most significant
players in the residential mortgage lending market
are savings institutions (including savings and
loan associations and mutual savings banks) and
U.S. agencies including Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac, and mortgage pass-through securi-
ties guaranteed by federal agencies or government
sponsored enterprises (GSEs). The share of savings
institutions in residential mortgage lending grew
rapidly after World War II, reaching 46 percent
in 1965. (See Figure 3.) These institutions main-
tained their market share until 1978, but then
lost share dramatically.
The decline of the savings institutions was a
consequence of rising nominal interest rates com-
bined with duration mismatch, which together
generated the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s.
By 1990, when the S&L crisis was finally resolved,
the share in the residential mortgage market of
these institutions had shrunk to 21.1 percent, less
than half of the peak market share twenty-five
years earlier. In the subsequent decade the market
share held by these institutions shrunk by half
again, to only 10.4 percent at the end of 2000.
As the presence of savings institutions in the
residential mortgage market receded, the financ-
ing void was filled by U.S. government agencies.
In 1967, immediately before the Housing Act of
1968 and reorganization of the established
Fannie Mae into Ginnie Mae and the new Fannie
Mae, the share of the residential housing mortgage
market for government agencies was 5.5 percent.
By 1990, these institutions captured a third of
the residential mortgage market, either through
mortgages purchased for their own portfolios or
through guaranteed mortgage-backed securities.
Recent data indicate that their market share is
42.5 percent as of the end of the third quarter of
2002. Clearly, the efficiency and stability of these
government agencies has become a critical factor
in the financing of residential construction.
FINANCIAL STABILITY
As Figure 4 shows, residential mortgage debt
has grown enormously as a fraction of total non-
financial debt in the United States. Starting at
slightly more than 5 percent at the end of World
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Home Mortgage Debt as Share of Total Nonfinancial DebtWar II, the share grew steadily until it exceeded
20 percent in the early 1960s. From then until
the mid-1980s, the share fluctuated in the neigh-
borhood of 20 percent or a bit more. In the past
15 years the share again grew steadily until it
reached 30 percent at the end of 2001.11 Given
the current magnitude of mortgage debt outstand-
ing relative to total credit market debt, any serious
instability in the financing of the residential cap-
ital stock has the potential for significant effects
not only on the housing industry but also on the
entire economy.
The annual reports of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, and the recent OFHEO report on Systemic
Risk, provide much useful information on risk
management. It is insightful to divide this sub-
ject into two parts. One concerns management of
credit, interest-rate, and operational risks that
can be modeled with the assistance of financial
theory and evidence from the behavior of financial
markets. Risks that can be studied and modeled
can be termed “quantifiable risks.” Nonquanti-
fiable risks deserve separate attention.
There are certainly cases in which firms, and
sometimes regulators, make mistakes in dealing
with quantifiable risks. Over the years, many
financial institutions have failed because of such
mistakes. Savings and loan association failures,
which ultimately led to the failure of the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC),
were mostly of this type. Starting in the late 1960s,
economists warned for years that the extreme
maturity mismatch from S&L balance sheets with
long-term, fixed-rate mortgages financed through
short-term liabilities put the industry at great risk.
As those risks were realized, many firms failed
and the S&L industry declined to a shadow of its
former self. The cost to taxpayers to make good
on the insurance guarantee offered by FSLIC was
in the neighborhood of $150 billion. As a conse-
quence of this experience, managers of firms,
regulators, and those active in financial markets
are today well aware of the need for careful risk
management.
The OFHEO report makes an extremely
important point about nonquantifiable risks:
A further obstacle to quantifying systemic risk
is the inherent difficulty in using quantitative
techniques to analyze catastrophic events such
as wars and financial crises. Such events are
rare, often involve significant departures from
recent historical experience and can develop
from a potentially infinite set of conditions.
Analysts generally do not model, simulate, or
predict the course and consequences of uncon-
ditional financial crises, making it difficult to
obtain a precise estimate of the likelihood of
a specific level of economic losses resulting
from potential financial crises. As a result,
government officials who seek to plan for such
events cannot rely on the usual quantitative
techniques to evaluate alternative strategies
for addressing them. (p. 87)
In a previous speech I suggested that periods
of great market instability arise when three condi-
tions are met. First, something happens that has
widespread significance—is large enough to mat-
ter to lots of people. Second, the triggering event
is a surprise. Ordinarily, events long anticipated
are not troublesome because corrective action
occurs before problems arise. Third, substantial
uncertainty clouds resolution of the problem. It
is especially difficult for investors to know what
to do when the government’s response to an
unfolding situation is highly uncertain.12
Given the extensive discussion of quantifiable
risks, I want to concentrate on the nonquantifiable
risks. It helps to make this issue concrete by listing
some examples. The failure or near failure of
Penn-Central, Continental-Illinois, Long-Term
Capital Management, Enron, and WorldCom may
not have been complete surprises to knowledge-
able insiders, but the shocks were certainly “news”
to market participants, regulators, and the general
public. No one predicted the timing of the stock
11 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts, Table L.2, Credit Market Debt Owed by Nonfinancial Sectors.
12 “Financial Stability” presented before The Council of State Governments Southern Legislative Conference Annual Meeting, New Orleans,
Louisiana, Aug. 4, 2002: <www.stlouisfed.org/news/speeches.html>.
ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS
6market crash of 1987 or the peak of the equity
markets in the spring of 2000. It is well known
that even the great Yale economist Irving Fisher
was caught completely off guard by the crash of
1929. Surprise legal decisions brought bankruptcy
to 52 firms involved with asbestos, to Dow-
Corning, and to Texaco. Finally, while experts in
terrorism may have understood the risks of attacks
on U.S. soil, their information was not sufficient
to prevent the September 11 attacks; certainly no
one else had any basis for predicting the attacks.
All of these cases, with the possible exception of
Continental-Illinois, reflected nonquantifiable
risks.
The point here is not to fault the forecasting
record of any person or any agency. Rather, it is
to illustrate that major unforeseen events that can
bring about a collapse in confidence or disruption
to the normal function of financial markets with-
out any warning can and do occur with some fre-
quency. The history of the United States, as well
as other countries, is replete with such examples.
A little-discussed but critically important
dimension of systemic risk is the uncertainty
about how the government and regulators will
respond to a major unforeseen event.13 Before the
1987 stock market crash there was considerable
overconfidence that a break in equity prices such
as occurred in 1929 was not possible given mod-
ern institutions. As a result, in the initial hours of
the 1987 crash, the public did not know exactly
how the Fed would react to a systemic liquidity
crisis. The way the Fed handled that situation is,
in my judgment, one of the high-water marks in
the history of our central bank. Not only was a
generalized liquidity crisis averted, but also con-
siderable institutional credibility was created.
The repercussions in financial markets on 9/11
might have been much worse had the Fed not
demonstrated in 1987 that it could and would
react immediately to major market disruptions.
There are historical cases where the reactions
by government agencies and regulators to unpre-
dicted crises, in my judgment, did not result in
such institution building. A good example is the
market perception that public policy has estab-
lished a “too big to fail” doctrine. This perception
grew over time and became more entrenched as
a result of the Continental-Illinois situation. The
net result is that market participants expect that,
under ill-defined conditions, regulators and/or
government agencies will in fact insure statutorily
uninsured positions involving large financial
institutions. Is the doctrine really “too big to fail”
or “too big to liquidate quickly?” How big does a
financial institution have to be, and does it have to
be a depository institution, to be “too big to fail?”
In this respect, there is tremendous ambiguity
about the status of the GSEs. The market prices
the GSEs’ debt as if there were a federal guarantee,
or a high probability of a guarantee, standing
behind their entire outstanding obligations. Yet,
there is no explicit guarantee in the law. Actual
experience has left the markets with all of these
important questions and ambiguities.
No one should underestimate the potential
importance of the ambiguity over the financial
status of the GSEs. Would “too big to fail” be
extended to GSEs in a crisis, and if so how would
it be effected in the absence of a federal insurance
agency with an unlimited line of credit? How
quickly could such a rescue be implemented?
It is not sufficient for any single GSE to argue
that its own financial condition is sound. If one
GSE comes under a cloud, others may also. That
has been our experience with financial firms again
and again. It is the process economists call “con-
tagion,” whereby uninvolved or innocent firms
are affected because the market has difficulty
distinguishing solid firms from those at risk.
In the case of the GSEs, the enormous scale
of their liabilities could create a massive problem
in the credit markets. If the market value of GSE
debt were to fall sharply, because of ambiguity
about the financial soundness of GSEs and about
the willingness of the federal government to back-
stop the debt, what would happen? I do not know,
and neither does anyone else.
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13 I discussed this issue at some length in “Expectations,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, March/April 2001, 83(2), pp. 1-10.Let me throw out for debate two steps the
federal government might take to resolve the
ambiguity that I see as a fundamental risk to the
continuing stability of our financial system. First,
various aspects of federal sponsorship that the
market reads as providing an implied guarantee of
GSE debt should be withdrawn.14 The Secretary
of the Treasury has the authority to buy GSE obli-
gations; in the case of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, the authority is up to a maximum of $2.25
billion for each firm. The GSEs could easily replace
this potential source of emergency financial sup-
port with credit lines at commercial banks, follow-
ing the widespread practice among issuers of
commercial paper. In any event, the amount
available at the discretion of the Secretary of the
Treasury is far too small to deal with a crisis in
the GSE debt market. Eliminating the Treasury’s
authority to lend to the GSEs would provide a sig-
nal that the government is serious when it says
that there is no government guarantee of GSE debt.
Second, over a transitional period of several
years, the GSEs should add to the amount of capi-
tal they hold. Capital is critical because when there
is a crisis in the securities markets, financially
strong firms can stand the pressure without last-
ing damage. Capital provides a cushion against
mistakes and unforeseeable circumstances. With
adequate capital, a firm can almost always raise
emergency loans to cover its liquidity problems.
The importance of adequate capital became clear
to policymakers as the S&L problems accumulated
in the late 1980s. Tightening of capital standards
for insured depository institutions and the admin-
istration of those requirements was a key part of
the reforms put in place at that time.
Capital is especially important for the GSEs
because their short-term obligations are large.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have debt obliga-
tions due within one year of about 45 percent of
their debt liabilities. Any problem in the capital
markets affecting these firms could become very
large, very quickly. It is important to understand
what “very quickly” means. Because of the scale
of the short-term obligations of the GSEs, the GSEs
are rolling over many billions of dollars of obliga-
tions each week. For this reason, a market crisis
could become acute in a matter of days, or even
hours.
Capital on the books of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac is well below the levels required of
regulated depository institutions. Let me quote a
paragraph from the 2001 Annual Report of Fannie
Mae, the largest single GSE. During 2001, Fannie
Mae issued $5 billion of subordinated debt that
received a rating of AA from Standard & Poor’s
and Aa2 from Moody’s Investors Service.
Fannie Mae’s subordinated debt serves as a
supplement to Fannie Mae’s equity capital,
although it is not a component of core capital.
It provides a risk-absorbing layer to supple-
ment core capital for the benefit of senior debt
holders and serves as a consistent and early
market signal of credit risk for investors. By
the end of 2003, Fannie Mae intends to issue
sufficient subordinated debt to bring the sum
of total capital and outstanding subordinated
debt to at least 4 percent of on-balance sheet
assets, after providing adequate capital to sup-
port off-balance sheet MBS. Total capital and
outstanding subordinated debt represented
3.4 percent of on-balance sheet assets at
December 31, 2001. (pp. 44-5)
The capital situation at Freddie Mac is about
the same as the one at Fannie Mae. The capital
adequacy standards applying to these two GSEs
were established by the Federal Housing Enter-
prises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of
1992. The core capital requirement is 2.5 percent
of on-balance sheet assets and 0.45 percent of
outstanding mortgage-backed securities and other
off-balance sheet obligations. The off-balance
sheet obligations have a capital requirement
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14 Farmer Mac, another GSE, was much in the news in the recent past. An article in the New York Times noted that one of the advantages conferred
by government sponsorship is “the ability to borrow almost as cheaply as the government does because of a perception of government backing
that emanates from a single section in its charter. That provision allows the Treasury, in certain circumstances, to provide up to $1.5 billion
in loans to Farmer Mac to support the guarantees the company extends on farm loans” (9 June 2002, p. 8, column 1).because they are guaranteed by Fannie and
Freddie.
In the private sector, government securities
dealers carry capital in the neighborhood of 5
percent, and other financial firms considerably
more. For example, FDIC-insured commercial
banks hold equity capital and subordinated debt
of a bit under 11 percent of total assets.
The issue with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
is not primarily one of disclosure. Their annual
reports disclose quite well the high degree of com-
plexity of their operations, and the small amount
of capital they carry above what is required by law.
My questions are these: Given the complexity of
their operations, is the capital standard in the law
adequate? Why is the standard so far below that
required of federally regulated banks? What will
happen to the housing market if Fannie and
Freddie become unstable?
Reports issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, and the recent OFHEO report on Systemic
Risk, indicate that the two firms employ state-of-
the-art risk management. Nevertheless, my sense
is that the firms are vulnerable to nonquantifiable
risks, because their capital positions are so low.
In my judgment, the only way for financial
institutions to ensure stability in the event of non-
quantifiable shocks is for them to maintain a sub-
stantial extra capital cushion above that deemed
necessary by analysis of quantifiable risks. One
way of thinking about the appropriate size of that
cushion might be to decide that a firm should be
able to meet its maturing obligations without bor-
rowing for a certain period of time. The length of
the period would depend on an assessment of how
long it would take to resolve whatever problem
might arise. Under this criterion, the capital cush-
ion would have to be invested in highly liquid,
short-term assets not subject to depreciation due
to interest rate changes or credit risks, so that
maturing obligations could be met for a time with-
out resort to issuing new obligations.
Dismissing the risks of nonquantifiable events
on the grounds that they are too improbable to
worry about is not a wise approach to public
policy. For one thing, these events are not so rare
as they might seem. For another, the costs of a
rare event that has major consequences to the
economy can easily outweigh a long stream of
benefits that are orders of magnitude smaller.
SUMMING UP
The United States has enjoyed many years
of a rising stock of residential capital. Moreover,
dwellings have increased in average size and
quality. The nation’s housing finance system has
been effective in making this growth possible.
The housing finance system historically has
been highly diversified. As a group, the share of
savings institutions in residential mortgage lend-
ing reached 46 percent in 1965, but hundreds of
institutions were involved. The diversification
of lending by different types of institutions and
numerous firms within a class of institutions has
been an important element of stability, because
the failure of one or even many firms has not
shaken the system. Competing firms have been
able to enter the market to fill any voids left by
failing firms.
Today, the housing finance system is heavily
concentrated. Just three firms—Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae—account for over
40 percent of the residential mortgage market.
Ginnie Mae is backed by the full faith and credit
of the U.S. government. Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac are not so backed and hold capital far below
that required of regulated banking institutions.
Should either firm be rocked by a mistake or by
an unforecastable shock, in the absence of robust
contingency arrangements, the result could be a
crisis in U.S. financial markets that would inflict
considerable damage on the housing industry
and the U.S. economy.
Housing in the Macroeconomy
9